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A NEW LOOK AT THE NATURAL LAW
OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
HAROLD C. PETROWITZ*
Controversy continues among legal scholars as to which philo-
sophy should guide the development of law. The three philosophies
perhaps most commonly advanced are those based on natural law,
on legal positivism, and on realism. Some commentators have taken
the view that these philosophies are incompatible.1 An effort will
be made in this discussion to demonstrate that this may not neces-
sarily be so. It is the author's specific objective to comment on some
new ideas relating Thomistic natural law to legal positivism and
legal realism, and to explore the natural law theory as the basis of
a world legal order. In so doing it will be useful to review the con-
tribution made to legal philosophy by St. Thomas, to analyze his
legal theories, and to see what meaning they have today. This is a
convenient point of departure because St. Thomas took the theories
of the Greek and Stoic philosophers and moulded them into con-
cise principles that have formed the basis of most legal philosophic
writing since his time.
THE ENVIRONMENT OF THOMISTIc NATURAL LAW
St. Thomas lived from 1224 to 1274 A.D., a period which saw
Europe emerging from the so-called dark ages. Thomas, far from
being a cloistered monk, was acutely aware of the political and soci-
al changes taking place around him. The student of his work cannot
help but be amazed at the brilliance and range of his thinking and
by his enormous output. Fortunately Thomas was permitted to re-
main an essentially independent scholar and therefore had the full
opportunity of developing his philosophical ideas. First, last, and al-
ways, however, St. Thomas was a theologian. All of his writing was
directed toward that end and his words on other matters were sub-
ordinate to it. It is somewhat anomalous that his theory of natural
law, which forms a relatively small part of his monumental Summa
Theologica, should have had such an impact on legal philosophy.
Just as the Summa was unfinished, his theory of natural law was
not completely developed, a fact that has caused much difficulty for
his commentators.
*Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American Univer-
sity. B.S., University of Michigan; LL.B., Georgetown University; LL.M.,
Columbia University.
1 See, e.g., MARITAIN, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 54 (1958).
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THE NATURAL LAW OF ST. THOMAS
St. Thomas defines law as "an ordinance of reason for the com-
mon good, made by him who has care of the community, and pro-
mulgated. '2 Note that for Thomas there is no direct tie between law
and theology. His definition appears to be technically correct and
2 AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I of pt. II, Q. 90, art. 4 (Eng. Dominion
Province transl. 1947) [hereinafter cited as S.T., e.g.: I-II S.T. 90, 4]. The
development of this definition can be followed through the articles of
Question 90: "Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced
to act or is restrained from acting . . . . Now the rule and measure of
human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts ......
I-IL S.T. 90, 1. The latter statement is of great significance; it demonstrates
the importance that Thomas attaches to the function of human reason. I-I
S.T. 90, 2:
[TIhe law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness.
• . .Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good,
any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be
devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common
good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
I-II S.T. 90, 4:
A law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule
or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and
measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force
which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have
to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them
by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to
obtain its force.
19BWlR jnr~ovsooDS 1a
.. . .. .. .. . . l. . C......... 1
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does not suffer from an apparent error as befell Austin's definition
of law based on the command theory.
Thomas classifies law 3 into eternal law-the dictates of divine
reason governing the whole community of the universe; divine law
-rules derived from eternal law and made known by revelation;
natural law-the participation of the eternal law in rational crea-
tures; and human law-particular determinations for the guidance
of human activity, devised by human reason, proceeding from the
precepts of natural law, and which may be derived from eternal law
if based on right reason.4 It is thus seen that, according to St. Thom-
as, divine law, natural law, and much of human law are based on
the eternal law, but that natural law is distinguished from divine
law, the former constituting intrinsic eternal law and the latter ex-
trinsic eternal law.
St. Thomas develops his first principles of natural law in true
Aristotelian manner. Recognizing that in demonstrating the truth
of any principle it is necessary to rely on prior demonstrable
truths until finally the first truth is reached which is incapable of
being demonstrated, he states a fundamental proposition which he
claims is self-evident because its predicate is contained in the notion
of its subject.5 He says:
Now as being is the first thing that falls under the appre-
hension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under
the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed
to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect
of good. Consequently the first principle in the practical
reason is the one founded on the notion of good, viz., that
3ld. Q. 91.
4Id. Q. 93, 3.
5 St. Thomas cites as an example of an undemonstrable truth in the specu-
lative order that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same
time. A. E. Taylor gives Aristotle's explanation of first principles in these
words: "[S]uccessive repetitions of the same sense perceptions give rise
to a single experience and it is by reflection on experience that we become
aware of the most ultimate truths." TAYLOR, ARISTOTLE 53 (1943). A
combination of intellectual and intuitive induction from sense perception
seems to take place. Gilson puts it this way:
The human intellect possesses therefore a light just sufficient in order
to acquire the knowledge of the intelligibles to which it can raise itself
by means of sensible things .... In a certain sense, indeed, we possess
in us the germ of all knowledge .... These pre-formed seeds, of which
we have natural knowledge, are first principles . . . . [T] hey are the
first conceptions which our intellect forms when we enter into contact
with the sensible. . . . The actual intellection of principles is no more
innate in us than are the conclusions of our deductive reasoning. . ..
But while we discover the former spontaneously, we have to acquire the
latter at the price of our research.
GILSON, THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS 215-16 (1956). This
approach to first principles in the practical order appears to have remained
relatively free from criticism.
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good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the
first precept of law, that good is to be done and pursued
and evil is to be avoided.6
This is the foundation on which the natural law theory of St. Thom-
as Aquinas is based and means simply that it is man's essential
nature to follow reason and to do good and avoid evil.
In this same context, St. Thomas lists several examples of
things "apprehended as good to which man has a natural inclina-
tion" including (1) conservation of life; (2) procreation and educa-
tion of offspring; (3) knowledge of truth (avoidance of ignorance);
(4) social existence in the sense of respecting the basic rights of
others; and (5) things of like nature. 7 Is this what Thomas meant
by the natural law? Did he mean more than this or less than this?
These questions have caused controversy since the day St. Thomas
died. It seems safe to say that the primary principles and the natural
inclinations specified above are, indeed, unchanging and common to
all humanity, immutable and universal, and thus meet the two tests
that the natural law must pass.8 If it is assumed that Thomas states
the natural law by saying only that man should follow reason and
do good and avoid evil, then the substance of the law becomes so
vague that it has very little meaning or value. On the other hand,
if it is assumed that he intended that the natural law include more
detailed precepts such as the prohibition against taking human life,
then his theory of natural law must fail because the more detailed
precepts patently cannot pass the tests for natural law principles
that he himself has established-a necessarily fatal defect. Extension
of fundamental natural law to cover precepts against the taking of
human life and other specific forms of conduct is exactly the mis-
take that many so-called natural law philosophers and commenta-
tors on St. Thomas have made, and in so doing they have performed
a great disservice to himY That this should have happened is readily
understandable because, as has been said previously, Thomas did not
fully develop his legal theories and his exposition of some of them
is therefore not entirely clear. His terminology is inexact, and fur-
thermore Thomas frequently digresses from his exposition on law
into theological and sociological matters with dubious results if his
treatise is to be thought of as a legal philosophy for the ages. 10
6 1-II S.T. 94, 2.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. Q. 94, 4-5.
9 The list is long and varied. It ranges all the way from Grotius and Locke
to Maritain and Rommen and on to lesser scholars.
10 Three instances of statements necessarily limited to short run sociology
are his comments on slavery, monarchy, and the role of the judiciary.
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By employing selectively the terminology of Adler, 1 and by
adopting the well developed arguments of a more recent analyst of
Thomistic natural law, '1 2 it is possible to develop some order out of
the chaos and perhaps to apply the theories of the good saint to use-
ful purpose. Let us designate as principles those primary and un-
11 See Adler, A Question about Law, in ESSAYS ON THOMISM 205 (Brennan
ed. 1942).
12 MacGuigan, St. Thomas and Legal Obligation, 35 NEW SCHOLASTICISM 281
(1961); MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral Law, 2 CURRENT LAW
AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 89 (Macdonald ed. 1961).
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demonstrable truths previously referred to, namely, that it is man's
essential nature to follow reason and do good and avoid evil, as well
as the concomitant things to which man has a natural inclination
-preservation of life, procreation, knowledge, and congenial social
existence. Thus we have specified the substantive content of the
natural law itself in terms of principles, which are considered to be
immutable, universal, immediately known, and rooted in human na-
ture itself. Necessary conclusions from these principles we will call
precepts. Included in this category would be essential conclusions
deduced from natural law, such as the prohibitions against murder,
theft, and lying. Contingent general determinations from the pre-
cepts, such as other less general parts of human positive law, are
designated as rules and might be illustrated by negligence laws and
minor penal statutes. Singular applications of these rules, for ex-
ample judicial decisions in particular cases, we will specify as de-
cisions.
Principles, then, are truths that are arrived at intuitively by
an operation of the intellect; they are not deduced through the pro-
cess of reasoning. Precepts, on the other hand, are the necessary
conclusions deduced by reason from the principles. Rules and deci-
sions are the general and particular determinations reached by a
deductive or inductive process from the precepts. According to this
method of terminology, precepts, rules, and decisions may have their
ultimate source in the natural law but are not technically part of
it. Although the terms used by St. Thomas himself in his explana-
tion of natural law and human law are somewhat indefinite, it does
seem entirely possible to interpret his words in the manner describ-
ed above without doing violence to his fundamental ideas. 13 This
approach provides a concept of natural law reduced to principles
which, though arrived at by metaphysical techniques, is not tied to
theology and is sufficiently detailed to form the basis of a working
body of precepts.
THE ROLE OF HUMAN POSITIVE LAW
St. Thomas recognized that the principles of natural law, while
they are universal and knowable by all, are still rather indefinite
for practical purposes. Therefore, in his discussion of law, he gives
a great deal of attention to human positive law as a means of laying
13 See I-I S.T. 94, 97. Several commentators on the natural law have sug-
gested or adopted this approach. Among them: Dabin in THE LEGAL PHIL-
OSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN (1950); Adler, supra note 11;
D'Entreves, The Case for Natural Law Re-examined, 1 NATURAL L.F. 5
(1956); Davitt, Law as Means to an End - Thomas Aquinas, 14 VAND.
L. R"v. 65 (1960); MacGuigan, supra note 12.
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down the specific provisions necessary for adequate governance of
society.1 4 It is clear that Thomas regarded human law as a necessary
implementation of natural law. In his development of human law
concepts, he brings out the following points: (1) Human law which
is based on natural precepts forms an explicit part of the eternal
law; it derives an obligatory character as the result of this relation-
ship. (2) Not all human law is derived from the principles of natur-
al law; some human law pertains to things outside the purview of
natural law. (3) Human law is directed toward regulations of the
social relationships of man and incorporates sanctions which compel
obedience. In this way, the precepts relating to natural law are en-
forced by something more tangible than the mere sense of obliga-
tion. (4) Human law should attempt to regulate only overt human
acts and does not endeavor to control or prescribe all human acts.
(5) Human law, insofar as it is based on natural law precepts, must
proceed from the will of man in accordance with reason.
THE MORAL LAW
At this point it becomes necessary to introduce another element
into the concept of law. Moral law is defined as precepts derived
from the natural law which are based on right reason and which
govern overt and covert human acts. The idea of moral law is in-
troduced to facilitate the establishment of norms against which hu-
man law can be measured and to provide for the development of a
resistance theory of law.
It will at once be apparent that human positive law and the
moral law which governs social conduct, coincide where human law
is based on natural law precepts;15 it is equally apparent that the
moral law intersects with positive divine law at a number of points.
Moral law is thus flexible enough to apply to covert acts of man
which are incapable of being judged or regulated by human positive
law. Furthermore, it can operate as a norm for judging human law.16
The notion of obligation to perform or refrain from performing cer-
tain acts is introduced by the moral law just as a similar coercive
effect is introduced by the sanction attached to human law. It is in
moral law that the common good and the individual good meet. 17
The moral law concept also permits the application of norms to rules
and decisions since many of these are derived from precepts, and in
14 I-I S.T. 95-96.
15 Adler refers to this part of moral law as ius gentium.
16 The terms "human positive law" and "human law" are considered to be
exactly synonymous in this paper.
17 This discussion of moral law is based on the illuminating development of
the whole subject by MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral Law, 2 CUR-
RENT LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 89, 100 (Macdonald ed. 1961).
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so doing, the moral law comes to recognize new customs and regu-
lations.
In the area of precepts, it is apparent that the moral law and
human law are co-extensive except for the distinction that the moral
law "exists" by the mere process of deductive reasoning from a
principle whereas the positive law does not come into being until it
is "willed" or enacted by the designated law-making authority. Once
the human law is enacted, however, then the two types merge and
the moral law applies a "static" norm to the positive law in the
sense that if the human law departs from this norm, it is malum in
se (intrinsically bad, according to St. Thomas) and thus invalid."
In other words, moral law has a substantive effect on human law
that is based on natural law precepts and thus we have developed a
theory of resistance in positive law.
In the area of rules and decisions, the moral law applies "dyna-
mic" norms " which have primarily an adjective effect and operate
on the procedural aspects of such rules and decisions. Therefore, if a
discrepancy exists between the moral law and the rule or decision,
the rule or decision is malum prohibitum (contrary to human wel-
fare in the words of St. Thomas) and ought not to be obeyed unless
there are extenuating circumstances such as avoidance of scandal
or preservation of public order.
Now the question is: how should this resistance theory operate?
Obviously, its critical region is with respect to positive law that is
held to be malum in se, because in such a case there would arise a
binding obligation not to obey the law. Actually, the magnitude of
this problem has been much exaggerated. In the first place positive
law ordinarily touches on the area of natural law precepts in rela-
Is Brown, Natural Law: Dynamic Basis of Law and Morals in the Twentieth
Century, 31 TUL. L. REv. 491 (1957). Professor Brown's interpretation of
Thomistic natural law is open to question; his terminology is, however,
useful.
1.9 Ibid.
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tively few places. Suppose a law-making body enacted a statute
prohibiting divine worship. Such a law would be malum in se
according to St. Thomas and would also be in conflict with the di-
vine law. The technical objections to a statute of this kind are that
it invades the area of individual moral law, is not a proper subject
of positive law, and would be virtually impossible to enforce. It
would seem very desirable to have a reliable standard for deter-
mining whether or not a statute qualifies as valid law. In the second
place, most of the precepts of the natural law operate negatively;
the only exception that comes to mind is the positive injunction to
provide for the common good. Take, for example, the precept
reflected by the moral law prohibiting theft. To violate this prohibi-
tion the positive law would have to compel those persons bound by
it to commit theft-a rather preposterous idea.2 0 Thirdly, it seems
obvious that the resistance theory should apply only to those
charged with enforcement of the law. It cannot reasonably be the
privilege of every citizen to decide whether he will obey the law or
not. Ordinarily, the initial responsibility for enforcing the law will
fall on the courts. For the three reasons cited above, it should be
apparent that the resistance theory in the substantive sense has very
limited application.
In the region of rules and decisions, the operation of the resist-
ance theory is generally in the sense of requiring natural justice or
what we usually refer to as due process of law. It is not necessary
for the resistance to be applied here as strictly as in the case of laws
that are mala in se, for practical considerations require us to recog-
nize that justice is not always perfect and that there may sometimes
be other factors that have to be taken into account. Nevertheless,
any moral pressure aimed at improving the administration of justice
would appear well directed.
In the more civilized countries, there seem to be only two areas
in which the resistance theory becomes a serious problem: the areas
of divorce as it affects the existence of the family relationship, and
of the power over human life in being as it is reflected in capital
punishment, euthanasia, and abortion. Divorce laws present a prob-
lem because they are widespread and because we don't yet know
with certainty whether the common good is best served by permit-
ting the dissolution of the family relationship under certain circum-
stances. Although many theologians say all divorce is morally
wrong, a final determination may have to depend on sociological
20 It must be conceded that failure to have a law prohibiting theft might
violate the positive moral injunction to provide for the common good.
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evidence yet to be acquired.21 Practically the problem has been
sidestepped either by having judges who disapprove of divorce from
a moral standpoint disqualify themselves or by viewing the divorce
action as not an intrinsically evil act.
As to the power over human life, it may be that if there are any
"absolutes" related to natural law principles and precepts, they
apply here. This area has not given a great deal of difficulty yet, but
it may in the years to come. Abortion and euthanasia are already
legally practiced in many culturally advanced nations, and capital
punishment is permitted in many of the United States. Power over
human life is clearly a moral issue of the highest order and the
greatest care must be taken in resolving it. Perhaps the most appro-
priate thing to say is that the development of man's wisdom may
not as yet have progressed to a level sufficient to warrant entrusting
power over human life to the vicissitudes of human positive law.
We know, for example, that most statutes under which capital pun-
ishment can be imposed are so overlaid with procedural safeguards
that a final decision in a capital case is often not rendered until
years after the initial trial. This can only be regarded as a sign of
lack of confidence in our ability to impose this extreme penalty
without the possibility of error. In any event, the experience in
Nazi Germany is surely the most compelling argument for the per-
petuation of a resistance theory against the possibility that govern-
mental morality may completely break down.
By using the concept of moral law as a parameter, an effort
has been made to demonstrate that there is a body of universal
principles arrived at by metaphysical techniques and applicable to
all mankind that can form the basis of precepts which are express-
ible as human positive law. The positive law formulated from these
precepts is separate from but guided and measured by the norm of
the moral law which in turn is founded on human reason. We have
seen that in some places where precepts are involved, human law
and moral law coincide, but this would not seem to create a fatal
ontological defect in natural law theory. It is further arguable that
positive law of this kind in one political entity should be compatible
with similar law in other political entities of similar cultural
achievement. Here, then, is the start of a common system of positive
substantive law that might be used as the foundation of a world
legal order. The system has the advantage that it is not tied to any
particular theology or arbitrary requirement, although it is entirely
possible that it is compatible with certain theological objectives. By
21 If the definitions given earlier in this paper are correct, divorce is not
governed by natural law principles.
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refining these principles and precepts, it is likely that their appeal
could be widened. Dabin has made a good start in this direction, and
his ideas on justice are particularly interesting and capable of fur-
ther development.2 2 It is to be hoped that someone will be able to
carry on where he, now in the twilight of his career, has paused.
NATURAL LAW AND THE ANALYTICAL POSITIVISTS
It has long been considered by many commentators that natural
law theories and the theories of the analytical positivists are funda-
mentally irreconcilable principally because of the problem of sepa-
rating the law that is from the law that ought to be. It is here sub-
mitted that as a practical matter these two theories are not really
in conflict. It has already been shown that human positive law 23 and
moral law act as a norm of positive law in many places, and where
positive law deals with precepts of the natural law, the two coin-
cide. It has further been demonstrated that the resistance theory of
natural law is very limited in its scope of operation.
22 Dabin, op. cit. supra note 13. A more detailed stipulation of prohibitions
would be another approach.
23 It should at once be recognized by any positivist that the mere enactment
of a law has a moral connotation in the sense that the enactment itself
involves a choice between two or more possible courses of action.
EQUITABLE BUILDING
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John Austin's theory of positive law 24 has been severely criti-
cized in many particulars. Probably the most criticized of all his
statements is his injunction to adhere strictly to the positive law
exactly as it is, as distinguished from what the interpreter thinks it
ought to be. However, it is not to be expected that Austin's writing
was entirely free from the possibility of error in terms of modern
application, any more than was the writing of St. Thomas Aquinas.
It is essential to remember what Austin was trying to do: he was
endeavoring to develop a technique for the analysis of positive law
with the end in view of erecting a concise body of legal statements
that could be clearly understood as law.25 He was concerned mainly
with law after it came into existence (when the moral decision has
already been made) and felt that if the legal terminology problem
could be solved, the legal statements could be made precise enough
so that very little "interpretation" of them would be required. Later
writers have improved considerably on Austin's basic theories.
Probably the most eloquent spokesman on analytical positivism
today is Professor H. L. A. Hart,2'26 who seems to have some reserva-
tions regarding the extent to which Austin's major objective can be
achieved in light of present day experience. Hart's elucidation of
what he terms the "penumbral effect" is at least one attempt at
framing an alternative approach7
It seems accurate to say that the analytical positivists continue
to concentrate on legal certainty in written law through the intro-
duction of exact terminology, an eminent objective indeed. Nor is it
apparent that there is any more fundamental conflict between ana-
lytical positivism and natural law than Bodenheimer finds between
positivism and legal realism.2 ' After suggesting that the positivists
ought not to try to make the printed law too rigid, thus foreclosing
to the judge the possibility of injecting any ad hoc historical or
sociological elements into his decision, Bodenheimer says the real
problem is: "failure . . . to provide the judiciary with a well consid-
ered theory of the non-formal (i.e., non-positive) sources of the
law.' '9 - Hart appears also to realize this, and the question now is
24 AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
25 This argument is persuasively advanced by Bodenheimer in an excellent
commentary on analytical positivism entitled Analytical Positivism, Legal
Realism, and the Future of Legal Method, 44 VA. L. REV. 365 (1958).
26 See for example HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). Some of Hart's ideas
seem a little obscure, but he has plenty of time ahead of him for fuller
development of his theory. His work has unquestionably made analytical
positivism a much more workable theory and Hart has been able to answer
adequately many of Austin's severest critics.
27 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).
28 Bodenheimer, supra note 25, at 370.
29 Id. at 375.
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asked: Might not the principles and precepts of the natural law fill
the gap?3 0
NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL REALISM
Probably the most significant recent contribution to jurispru-
dence is that made by the legal realists, including Holmes, Cardozo,
and Llewellyn.31 The self styled natural law writers have been cry-
ing "wolf" apparently on the ground that man is in danger of being
dehumanized by realist techniques. But what can possibly be wrong
with the application of modern scientific techniques to the making
of positive law and the rendering of judicial decisions? This appears
to do nothing more than follow the advice of St. Thomas to examine
with a critical eye precepts, rules, and decisions in order to insure
that they are in accord with the dictates of reason.32 It should be
recalled that every bit of natural law and derivation from it that
has been discussed in this paper is rooted either in the natural incli-
nations of man or based on human reason-and this includes even
our parametric moral law. We have, indeed, stacked our chips on
human nature and reason. There appears to be no real barrier be-
tween natural law theory as formulated here and the legal realists
when Professor Jones can write:
The ethical theory to be drawn from legal realism is, I
suggest, that the moral dimension of law is to be sought
not in rules and principles, but in the process of responsible
decision, which pervades the whole law in life.3
Both the natural law advocate and the positivist may wish to cau-
tion the realist against excessive tailoring of the law to individual
situations at the expense of legal predictability, simplicity, and so-
cial order, but neither can gainsay the desire of the realist to get at
objective facts and to make the law respond to human needs insofar
as is reasonably possible. Cardozo, one of the greatest legal philo-
sophers of this century and a legal realist of the first water, may
somewhat misconceive the role of our natural law theory when he
quotes Berolzheimer as saying:
The modern philosophy of law comes in contact with the
natural law philosophy in that the one as well as the other
30It should be mentioned that Austin's predecessor, Bentham, worked out a
legal theory on the basis of utility, pain, and pleasure with a calculus of
legal values which incorporates substantive law aspects. Bentham's approach
does not seem best adapted to meet the problem that Bodenheimer outlines.
31 Whether Pound can be considered a true realist is debatable. His sociological
objectives of law are certainly compatible with those of the realists even
if his methodology is not.
32 1-II S.T. 94, 4-5.
33 H. W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal Realism, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1961). '
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seeks to be the science of the just. But the modern philo-
sophy of law departs essentially from the natural law
philosophy in that the latter seeks a just, natural law out-
side of positive law, while the new philosophy of law de-
sires to deduce and fix the element of the just in and out of
the positive law-out of what it is and of what is becom-
ing.3
4
If the formulation of natural law theory contained in this paper
has any value, the gap between "natural law philosophy" and "the
new philosophy of law" does not seem to be as great as is expressed
by the words of the quotation.
3 5
CONCLUSION
To summarize briefly, the objective of this paper has been to
reduce natural theory to a set of practical concepts which are essen-
tially consistent with the expressed legal doctrines of St. Thomas
Aquinas and which can fill an urgent requirement of the present day
-that of providing the basis of a world legal order. Natural law
principles might be recognized as the foundation from which to de-
rive precepts expressed as positive law pertaining to some subjects
and implied as an unwritten moral law pertaining to other matters.
A further effort has been made to show that the natural law theory
thus formulated is compatible with the two most significant legal
,-heories of our day, analytical positivism and legal realism. In devel-
oping this formulation of natural law theory, great care has been
taken in the definition and use of technical terms in the hope of
eliminating confusion and of communicating ideas efficiently.
There is only one real reason for taking this approach to natural
law theory: it is infinitely preferable to have a workable and accept-
able body of law with which to meet a pressing jurisprudential need
than to see a fine source of substantive law relegated to the category
of legal history. In striving for this objective, as in the resolution of
most complex problems, some compromises have had to be made. It
has been necessary virtually to separate natural law theory from
,neology-certainly from any particular theology. 6 Natural law
principles have been tied to the natural inclinations of man as
arrived at by metaphysical methods, and natural law precepts and
34 2 BEROLZHEIMER, SYSTEM DER RECHTS UND WIRTH - SCHAFTPHILOSOPHIE
27, Quoted by CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 132 (1921).
35 It is well to remember that the quoted words were written shortly after the
turn of the century and that consequently Berolzheimer's - and even Car-
dozo's - view of natural law theory may have been quite. different from
that outlined in this paper.
36 It does not appear that the approach taken makes natural theory incon-
sistent with any particular theology.
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the moral law have been, for better or for worse, firmly linked to
the dictates of human reason. Simplification has been necessary. A
good many commentators will argue that by taking these steps the
natural law has been deprived of its character of absoluteness and
made too relativistic 3 7 in addition to being oversimplified beyond
recognition. There may be some substance to these charges, but,
though the risk is great, it is at least arguable that some acceptable
natural law is preferable to none at all. With careful development,
this flexible natural law theory may prove useful beyond the wildest
expectations of its advocates.
Really original and useful ideas in any field are rare and, in the
area of philosophy, almost impossible to produce. The best that can
be hoped for here is that some clarity has been added to existing
ideas and current thinking related to natural law so that a better
understanding of these theories will result.
17 Davitt seems to include just such a caveat at the conclusion of his article
on the natural law of St. Thomas, supra note 12, at 80, when he makes
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